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ABSTRACT	  
Is	   quite	   acceptable	   that	   tourism	   activity	   is	   intensely	   subject	   to	  market	   failures	   and,	  
naturally,	   requires	   government	   intervention.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it’s	   points	   out	   that	  
government	   intervention	   is	   another	   source	  of	  policy	   failure.	  Attending	   this	   situation,	  
we	   investigate	   the	   importance	   of	   public	   policy	   instruments	   in	   Public	   Administration	  
field,	  as	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  solving	  public	  problems	  related	  with	  market	  failures,	  while	  
considering	   possible	   negative	   impacts	   of	   the	   intervention	   itself.	   These	   public	   policy	  
instruments	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  several	  issues,	  including	  tourism	  policy.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
we	   intend	  with	   this	  work	   to	   examine	   the	   tourism	   policy	   instruments	   applied	   to	   the	  
Portuguese	  municipalities	  context.	  
	  
1.	  INTRODUCTION	  
It	   is	   widely	   accepted	   among	   the	   scientific	   community	   the	   involvement	   and	   the	  
relevance	   that	   national,	   regional	   and	   local	   governments	   play	   in	   tourism	   and	   the	  
development	   of	   that	   activity	   (Baum	   and	   Szivas,	   2008;	   Dregde,	   2001;	   Mifsud,	   2006;	  
Pearce,	   2001;	   Scott,	   2011).	   Several	   authors	   advocate	   that	   all	   governments	   have	   a	  
policy	   for	   tourism	   due	   to	   its	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   importance,	   whether	   it	  
represents	   an	   active	   role	   or	   a	   passive	   approach	   (Baum	   and	   Szivas,	   2008;	   Dimitris,	  
Aimilia	   and	   George,	   2005;	   Scott,	   2011).	   In	   this	   sense,	   Kerr	   (2003)	   considers	   that	  
government	   involvement	   is	   widespread	   and	   a	   good	   tourism	   public	   policy	   requires	  
involvement	   of	   all	   levels	   of	   government.	   Elliott	   (1997)	   also	   refers	   that	   only	  
governments	  have	   the	  power	   to	  provide	   the	  political	   stability,	   security	   and	   the	   legal	  
and	  financial	  framework	  which	  tourism	  requires.	  
If,	   on	   one	   hand,	   the	   literature	   argues	   that	   tourism	   policy	   is	   an	   important	   field	   of	  
research,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   governments	   are	   interested	   in	   tourism	   due	   to	   the	  
magnitude	   of	   its	   economic,	   social	   and	   environmental	   impacts	   (Akama,	   2002;	   Scott,	  
2011).	  Tourism	  activities	  are	  very	  complex	  in	  nature	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  private	  
sector	   can	   satisfy	   entirely	   government	   policy	   purposes	   (Candela,	   Figini	   and	   Scorcu,	  
2005;	  Wanhill,	  2005).	  Thus,	  Wanhill	   (2005)	  states	  that	  historically,	  governments	  have	  
intervened	  in	  order	  to	  both	  assist	  and	  regulate	  tourism	  activity.	  
But,	  what	  are	   the	  motivations	   for	   this	   intervention?	  Why	  do	  governments	  engage	   in	  
the	  formulation	  of	  tourism	  policy?	  One	  reason	  is	  strongly	  suggested	  by	  the	  literature	  of	  
market	   failure	   theory	   (Baum	   and	   Szivas,	   2008;	   Dimitris,	   Aimilia	   and	   George,	   2005;	  
Fayos-­‐Sola,	  1996;	  Fleischer	  and	  Felsenstein,	  2000;	  Hartley	  and	  Hooper,	  1993;	  Michael,	  
2001;	  Monge-­‐González,	   River	   and	   Tijerino,	   2010;	   Scott,	   2011;	   Sinclair,	   1998;	   Smeral,	  
1998;	  Wanhill,	   2005;).	   These	   authors	   point	   out	   that	   tourism	  activity	   is	   recognized	   in	  
literature	  as	  an	  activity	  that	   is	  particularly	  subject	  to	  market	   failures	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  
presents	  several	  reasons	  that	  justify	  government	  intervention.	  	  
 3	  
In	   response	   to	  market	   failure	   theory,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   find	   in	   the	   scientific	   literature	  
arguments	   supporting	   government	   failure	   theory	   derived	   from	   the	   public	   choice	  
perspective	   (Sinclair,	   1998).	  While	   acknowledging	   that	   market	   imperfections	   can	   be	  
solved	   through	   internalization	   and	   allocation	   of	   property	   rights,	   considering	  
government	   intervention	   as	   unnecessary	   (Coase,	   1960),	   this	   work	   also	   points	   out	  
government	   intervention	   as	   the	   main	   source	   of	   policy	   failure	   (Sinclair,	   1998).	  
Government	   actions	   may	   not	   be	   able	   to	   correct	   a	   market	   failure	   or	   can	   create	  
additional	   distortions	   (Michael,	   2001;	  Monge-­‐González,	   River	   and	   Tijerino,	   2010).	   In	  
sharp	  contrast	  with	  market	   failure	   theory,	  proponents	  of	   the	  public	   choice	  approach	  
have	   argued	   a	   strongly	   critical	   attitude	   of	   the	   government's	   interventionist	   role	  
(Michael	   2001;	   Sinclair,	   1998).	   As	   pointed	   out	   by	   Baum	   and	   Szivas	   (2008),	   Wanhill	  
(2005)	   and	  Wolf	   (1994),	   markets	   and	   governments	   should	   not	   be	   seen	   as	   mutually	  
exclusive	  mechanisms,	  but	  rather	  complementary.	  	  
In	   this	  way,	  we	   consider	   the	   importance	  of	   public	   policy	   instruments	   as	   the	   tools	   of	  
government	   to	   solve	   problems	   associated	   with	   market	   failures,	   while	   considering	  
possible	   negative	   impacts	   of	   the	   intervention	   itself.	   This	   new	   approach	   has	   raised	   a	  
growing	   interest	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  several	   studies	   in	   the	  existing	   literature	   (Peters	  
and	  Van	  Nispen,	  1998).	  According	  to	  Blair	  (2002),	  since	  the	  1980s,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  refer	  
to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  research	  line	  on	  the	  instrumental	  approach.	  Given	  the	  importance	  
that	   policy	   tools	   research	  has	   acquired,	   it	   has	  been	  applied	   to	   various	   areas,	   among	  
which	  we	  can	  find	  tourism	  policy	  (Bramwell,	  2005;	  Dimitris,	  Aimilia	  and	  George,	  2005;	  
Hall	   and	   Jenkins,	   1997;	   Jordan,	  Wurzel	   and	   Zito,	   2005;	   Logar,	   2010;	   Prideaux,	   2005;	  
Scott,	  2011;	  Zito,	  Radaelli	  and	  Jordan,	  2003).	  
In	   this	   sense,	   given	   that	   Portugal	   has	   recently	   approved	   a	   statutory	   framework	   for	  
tourism	   policies	   and	   the	   tools	   for	   their	   implementation,	  we	   consider	   appropriate	   to	  
evaluate	   the	   impact	   of	   policy	   instruments	   in	   tourism	  management	   at	   the	  municipal	  
level,	  contributing	  to	  the	  new	  framework	  of	  those	   instruments.	  The	  relevance	  of	  this	  
research	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   a	   couple	   of	   ways.	   Firstly,	   and	   compared	   to	   the	   extant	  
international	  literature	  (Blair,	  2002;	  Logar,	  2010;	  Peters,	  2000;	  Peters	  and	  Van	  Nispen,	  
1998),	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  note	  a	  growing	  importance	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  those	  instruments	  
as	   new	   ways	   of	   operating	   in	   political	   action.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   increasing	  
application	   of	   policy	   tools	   to	   various	   areas,	   including	   tourism,	   has	   created	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   investigate	  which	   instruments	   are	   used	   by	   Portuguese	  municipalities	  
and	  what	   are	   the	   underlying	   determinants	   of	   that	   choice.	   As	   a	   result,	   this	   research	  
contributes	   to	   an	   unexplored	   topic	   in	   the	   literature.	   This	   work	   aims	   to	   achieve	   the	  
following	  objectives:	  i)	  to	  analyse	  and	  explain	  the	  use	  of	  policy	  tools;	  ii)	  to	  identify	  the	  
tourism	   policy	   tools;	   iii)	   to	   contextualize	   tourism	   public	   policies	   at	   the	   national	   and	  
local	   levels;	   iv)	   to	   describe	   and	   explain	   the	   tourism	   policy	   tools	  most	   often	   used	   by	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Portuguese	   municipalities;	   v)	   To	   identify	   the	   main	   determinants	   of	   policy	   tool	  
adoption.	  	  
Thus,	  we	  intend	  to	  answer	  two	  fundamental	  questions,	  one	  descriptive	  and	  the	  other	  
analytical,	  respectively:	  i)	  what	  tourism	  policy	  tools	  are	  most	  often	  used	  by	  Portuguese	  
municipalities?	   ii)	   What	   policy	   tools	   do	   Portuguese	   Local	   governments	   adopt	   to	  
address	  market	  failures?	  In	  order	  to	  conduct	  this	  research,	  we	  engage	  in	  quantitative	  
research	   methods.	   Based	   on	   our	   theoretical	   framework,	   we	   design	   a	   series	   of	  
hypotheses	  and	  subject	  them	  to	  empirical	  tests	  using	  data	  collected	  for	  this	  purpose.	  
To	  evaluate	  which	  tourism	  public	  policy	  tools	  are	  most	  frequently	  used	  by	  Portuguese	  
municipalities,	  we	  will	  employ	  a	  survey	  questionnaire	  applied	  to	  all	  municipalities.	  
	  
2.	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
According	   to	   the	   welfare	   economics	   approach,	   when	   markets	   operate	   in	   perfect	  
competition,	  no	  government	  intervention	  is	  required	  to	  achieve	  Pareto	  efficiency,	  i.e.,	  
a	  situation	  in	  which	  no	  single	  economic	  agent	  or	  group	  can	  improve	  its	  welfare	  without	  
worsening	   the	   welfare	   of	   other	   agents	   or	   groups	   (Michael	   2001;	   Monge-­‐González,	  
Rivera	  and	  Tijerino,	  2010;	  Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  In	  others	  words,	  Pareto	  efficiency	  
occurs	   through	   voluntary	   actions	   without	   any	   need	   for	   public	   policy	   (Weimer	   and	  
Vining,	   2005).	   As	  Michael	   (2001)	   denotes	   in	   a	   perfect	  world	   the	   competitive	  market	  
ensures	  that	  productions	  costs	  are	  equal	  to	  real	  social	  costs.	  In	  practice,	  the	  economic	  
reality	   rarely	   corresponds,	   perfectly,	   to	   the	   assumptions	   of	   an	   idealized/perfectly	  
competitive	  model	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
The	   violations	   of	   these	   assumptions	   generated	   market	   failure	   theory.	   As	   stated	   by	  
Stiglitz	   (2002),	   Michael	   (2001)	   and	   Wolf	   (1994)	   argue	   that	   market	   failures	   justify	  
government	  intervention,	  since	  the	  supply	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  social	  
costs	  are	   functions	   that	   can	  only	  be	  effectively	   carried	  out	  by	  governments.	  Weimer	  
and	   Vining	   (2005)	   also	   point	   out	   that	   market	   failures	   result	   from	   circumstances	   in	  
which	   social	   surplus	   is	   larger	   under	   some	   alternative	   allocation	   to	   the	   one	   resulting	  
under	   market	   equilibrium.	   In	   these	   situations,	   government	   intervention	   can	   be	  
justified	   as	   a	   way	   of	   getting	   a	   result	   as	   close	   as	   possible	   to	   the	   Pareto	   optimum	  
(Monge-­‐González,	  River	  and	  Tijerino,	  2010).	  
	  
2.1.	  Market	  Failures	  
The	   markets	   are	   usually	   the	   best	   available	   mechanism	   for	   allocating	   resources.	  
However,	  some	  markets	  are	  subject	  to	  imperfections	  or	  failures	  that	  distort	  prices	  and	  
undermine	   the	  market’s	   ability	   to	   achieve	   an	   efficient	   allocation	   of	   resources	   (Blake	  
and	   Sinclair,	   2007	   and	   Ishwaran	   and	   Cimato,	   2009).	   As	   the	   authors	   point	   out	   the	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economic	   efficiency	   depends	   on	   a	   number	   of	   key	   assumptions:	   markets	   being	  
complete,	  markets	   being	   perfectly	   competitive,	   and	   all	   agents	   in	   the	  market	  making	  
decisions	  based	  on	  full	  information.	  	  
Market	   failure,	   i.e.,	   situations	   in	   which	   market	   behaviour	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   Pareto	  
efficiency,	  forms	  the	  basic	  economic	  rationale	  for	  public	  sector	  involvement	  in	  private	  
affairs	   (Field,	   1997;	   Fleischer	   and	   Felsenstein,	   2000;	   Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	  
Traditionally,	   the	   scientific	   community	   commonly	   recognizes	   four	   market	   failures:	  
public	   goods,	   externalities,	   natural	   monopolies,	   and	   asymmetric	   information	  
(Gooroochurn	   and	   Sinclair,	   2005;	  Michael,	   2001;	   Sinclair	   and	   Stabler,	   1997;	   Smeral,	  
1998;	  Wolf,	  1994;	  Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
Public	   goods	   were	   firstly	   defined	   by	   Samuelson	   (1954)	   as	   possessing	   two	  
characteristics:	  nonrivalrous	   in	  consumption	  and	  nonexcludable	   in	  use	  (Smeral,	  1998;	  
Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  The	  same	  authors	  state	  that	  a	  good	   is	  nonrivalrous	  when	  
the	   consumption	   by	   one	   individual	   does	   not	   disturb	   its	   accessibility	   to	   others	  
consumers.	   For	   its	  part,	   a	  good	   is	  nonexcludable	  when	   it	   is	   technically	   impossible	  or	  
very	  expensive	  to	  prevent	  potential	  consumers	  from	  benefiting	  from	  it.	  Once	  the	  good	  
is	  provided	  for	  one	  individual,	  it	  becomes	  available	  to	  all.	  
Additionally,	   Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   refer	   a	   third	   characteristic	   of	   public	   goods:	  
existence	  of	  congestion.	  A	  good	  is	  congested	  if	  the	  marginal	  social	  cost	  of	  consumption	  
exceeds	   the	   marginal	   private	   costs	   of	   consumption.	   Some	   goods	   may	   only	   be	  
nonrivalrous	   over	   some	   range	   of	   usage,	   but	   at	   some	  higher	   level	   of	   use,	   consumers	  
begin	  to	  impose	  costs	  on	  each	  other	  (for	  example,	  the	  highways).	  
The	  presence	  of	   these	   features	   can	   lead	   to	   the	   failure	  of	  markets	   to	   achieve	  Pareto	  
efficiency:	  the	  market	  either	  undersupplies	  or	  fails	   to	  supply	  at	  all	   (Smeral,	  1998).	  As	  
pointed	  out	  by	  Sinclair	  and	  Stabler	   (1997),	   the	  markets	  have	   little	  or	  no	   incentive	   to	  
supply	  such	  goods,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  exclude	  consumers.	  Even	  when	  such	  exclusion	  is	  
possible,	   some	   individuals,	   known	   as	   free	   riders,	   adopt	   a	   strategy	   of	   not	   paying,	   for	  
instance	  when	  payment	  is	  voluntary	  (free	  rider	  problem).	  
Externalities,	   as	   a	   second	   market	   failure,	   are	   almost	   an	   indissoluble	   part	   of	   public	  
goods	   (Dolan	   and	   Lindsey,	   1987;	   Sinclair	   and	   Stabler,	   1997).	   As	   Smeral	   (1998)	   and	  
Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   denote	   an	   externality	   represents	   a	   situation	   where	  
consumption	   or	   production	   activity	   has	   an	   indirect	   effect	   on	   other	   consumption	   or	  
production	   activities,	   which	   is	   not	   reflected	   directly	   in	   market	   prices.	   This	   indirect	  
effect	   can	   be	   positive	   (positive	   externalities)	   or	   negative	   (negative	   externalities).	  
Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  reserve	  the	  label	  externality	  problem	  for	  those	  situations	  in	  
which	   the	   good	   convening	   the	   valued	   impact	   on	   non-­‐consenting	   parties	   is	   the	   by-­‐
product	  of	  either	  the	  production	  or	  consumption	  of	  some	  good;	  such	  as	   for	  example	  
open	  resources	  and	  ambient	  public	  goods.	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Usual	  examples	  of	  negative	  externalities	  involve	  air	  and	  water	  pollution	  generated	  by	  
firms	   in	   their	   production	   activities	   and	   the	   cigarette	   smoke	   that	   non-­‐smokers	   must	  
breathe	   in	   public	   places	   (Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	   According	   to	   the	   traditional	  
economic	   theory,	   the	   existence	   of	   negative	   externalities	   justifies	   government	  
intervention	  to	  restrict	  or	  penalize	  the	  activity	  in	  question	  so	  that	  offenders	  take	  into	  
account	   the	   costs	   imposed	   upon	   third	   parties	   (Alves	   and	   Moreira,	   2004).	   Common	  
examples	  of	  positive	  externalities	   include	  vaccinations	   that	   reduce	  everyone’s	   risk	  of	  
infection	   disease	   and	   education	   support	   (Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	   The	   positive	  
externalities	   also	   justify	   government	   intervention	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   or	   encourage	  
these	  activities.	  	  
A	   natural	   monopoly	   is	   the	   third	   type	   of	   market	   failure	   mentioned.	   This	   monopoly	  
occurs	   in	   an	   industry	   in	  which	   total	   cost	   are	   kept	   to	   a	  minimum	  by	   having	   just	   one	  
producer	  serve	  the	  whole	  market	  (Dolan	  and	  Lindsey,	  1987).	  Depoorter	  (1999)	  argues	  
that	  a	  natural	  monopoly	  exists	  in	  an	  industry	  where	  a	  single	  firm	  can	  produce	  output	  
such	  as	  to	  supply	  the	  market	  at	  a	   lower	  per	  unit	  cost	  than	  can	  two	  or	  more	  firms.	   In	  
the	  same	  vein,	  Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  argue	  that	  natural	  monopoly	  happens	  when	  
the	   average	   cost	   slowly	   declines	   over	   the	   relevant	   range	   of	   demand	   and	   is	  
characterized	  by	  a	  single	  firm	  that	  can	  produce	  the	  output	  at	  lower	  cost	  that	  any	  other	  
market	   arrangement.	   The	   authors	   also	   refer	   that	   a	   natural	   monopoly	   involves	   an	  
undersupply	   problem	   and	   may	   include	   additional	   social	   surplus	   losses.	   As	   Joskow	  
(2005)	   pointed	   out,	   markets	   with	   natural	   monopoly	   characteristics	   are	   assumed	   to	  
lead	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   economic	   performance	   problems:	   excessive	   prices,	   production	  
inefficiencies,	   costly	   duplication	   of	   facilities,	   poor	   service	   quality,	   and	   to	   have	  
potentially	  undesirable	  distributional	   impacts.	   In	   these	  situations	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  
achieve	  Pareto	  efficiency.	  
Dolan	   and	   Lindsey	   (1987)	   argue	   that	   the	   intrinsic	   problem	   raised	   by	   this	   type	   of	  
monopoly	   is	  how	   to	  keep	   the	   industry	   from	   taking	  advantage	  of	   its	  position	   to	   raise	  
prices	  and	  restrict	  output	  as	  it	  has	  no	  incentives	  for	  efficiency	  and	  its	  main	  interest	  is	  
profit	   maximization.	   The	   solution	   presented	   by	   the	   literature	   in	   order	   to	   improve	  
market	  efficiency	  is	  the	  government	  intervention.	  The	  government	  allows	  just	  one	  firm	  
to	   operate	   but	   regulates	   the	   price	   at	   which	   the	   firm	   can	   sell	   its	   output	   (Dolan	   and	  
Lindsey,	  1987).	  	  
The	   last	   well-­‐known	   market	   failure	   is	   asymmetric	   information.	   Weimer	   and	   Vining	  
(2005)	   suggest	   that	   information	   is	   involved	   in	  market	   failure	  due	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  
several	  situations	  where	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  about	  a	  good’s	  attributes	  varies	  in	  
relevant	  ways	  across	  individuals.	  For	  example,	  information	  asymmetry	  exists	  between	  
buyer	  and	  seller	  or	  between	  externality	  generator	  and	  affected	  party.	  In	  this	  context,	  
the	   inefficiency	   due	   to	   asymmetric	   information	   is	   associated	   with	   potential	   social	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surplus	   losses.	   In	   the	  same	  vein,	  Smeral	   (1998)	   refers	   that	   if	   consumers	  do	  not	  have	  
accurate	   information	  about	  market	  prices	  or	  product	  quality,	   the	  market	   system	  will	  
not	   operate	   efficiently.	   This	   lack	   of	   information	  may	   give	   producers	   an	   incentive	   to	  
supply	   too	   much	   of	   some	   products	   and	   too	   little	   of	   others.	   In	   other	   cases,	   some	  
consumers	   may	   not	   buy	   a	   product	   even	   though	   they	   would	   benefit	   from	   doing	   so,	  
while	  other	  consumers	  buy	  products	  that	   leave	  them	  worse	  off.	   In	  others	  words,	  the	  
consumers	   can	   underestimate	   or	   overestimate	   the	   quality	   of	   a	   good,	   leading	   to	  
overconsumption	  or	  underconsumption	  situations	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
In	  summary,	  these	  are	  the	  traditional	  markets	  failures	  representing	  situations	  in	  which	  
the	  market	   is	  not	  perfectly	  efficient	  and	  fails	   to	  produce	  the	  Pareto	  optimum.	  As	  we	  
already	   mentioned,	   the	   welfare	   economics	   literature	   argues	   that	   government	  
intervention	   can	   potentially	   increase	   efficiency	   through	   the	   use	   of	   public	   policy	  
instruments.	   The	   table	   1	   reviews	   those	   traditional	   market	   failures	   and	   their	  
implications	  for	  efficiency.	  	  
	  
Table	  1	  -­‐	  Market	  Failure	  and	  Implications	  for	  Efficiency	  
Market	  Failure	   Implications	  for	  Efficiency	  
Public	  Goods	   The	  market	  either	  undersupply	  or	  doesn’t	  supply	  at	  all	  (undersupply)	  The	  free	  rider	  problem	  (overconsumption)	  
Externalities	   Positive	  externalities	  (undersupply	  or	  underconsumption)	  Negative	  externalities	  (oversupply)	  
Natural	  Monopoly	   Declining	  average	  costs	  (undersupply)	  	  
Asymmetric	  
Information	  
Quality	  overestimation	  of	  goods	  (overconsumption)	  
Quality	  underestimation	  of	  goods	  (underconsumption)	  
Source:	  Adapted	  form	  Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005	  
	  
2.2.	  Public	  Policy	  Instruments	  
The	  various	  changes	  experienced	   in	  public	  administration	  have	  also	  affected	  the	  way	  
of	  providing	  public	  goods	  and	  services.	  In	  the	  past,	  government	  activity	  was	  restricted	  
to	   direct	   provision;	   currently,	   government	   action	   involves	   various	   policy	   instruments	  
(Salamon,	   2002;	   Blair,	   2002).	   This	   new	   approach	   to	   solve	   public	   problems	   led	   to	   a	  
growing	   interest	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   policy	   instruments	   as	   demonstrated	   by	   several	  
studies	   in	   the	  existing	   literature	   (Blair,	   2002;	   Field,	   1997;	   Salamon,	  2002;	  Peters	   and	  
Van	   Nispen,	   1998;	   Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	   According	   to	   Blair	   (2002),	   since	   the	  
1980s,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  mention	   the	  existence	  of	   a	   research	   line	  on	   the	   instrumental	  
approach.	   Policy	   instruments	   became	   very	   popular	   as	   solutions	   for	   market	   failures	  
because	  they	  are	  the	  most	  politically	  feasible	  options;	  even	  if	   in	  some	  situations	  they	  
are	  not	  the	  most	  economically	  efficient	  solution	  (Monge-­‐González,	  River	  and	  Tijerino,	  
2010).	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This	   approach,	   originally	   developed	   in	  Germany,	   Denmark,	   Holland	   and	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  
countries,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  political	  intentions	  into	  
administrative	  proceedings,	   i.e.,	   considers	   that	   governments	   use	   certain	   instruments	  
to	   influence	   the	   economy	   and	   society	   and	   the	   choice	   of	   instruments	   has	   different	  
impacts	  on	  the	  success	  of	  those	   intentions	  (Blair,	  2002;	  Peters,	  2000;	  Peters	  and	  Van	  
Nispen,	  1998).	  Howlett	  (1991)	  defines	  precisely	  the	  instruments	  as	  techniques	  of	  social	  
intervention	   or	   means	   of	   control	   that	   are	   available	   to	   governments	   to	   implement	  
varied	  public	  policies.	  Policy	  instruments,	  or	  tools	  of	  government,	  are	  not	  neutral,	  their	  
choices	  are	  rarely	  reduced	  to	  simple	  technical	  criteria	  and	  policy	  makers	  usually	  do	  not	  
enjoy	  complete	  freedom	  in	  their	  selection	  (Peters	  and	  Van	  Nispen,	  1998).	  
The	   research	   developed	   has	   identified	   several	   types	   of	   instruments,	   including	   direct	  
government,	   government-­‐sponsored	   enterprises,	   economic	   regulation,	   social	  
regulation,	   government	   insurance,	   public	   information,	   supply	   and	   demand	   fees	   and	  
charges,	   licensing,	   securities	   market,	   contracting,	   concession,	   grants,	   loan	   and	   loan	  
guarantees,	   tax	   expenditures,	   vouchers	   and	   tort	   liability	   (Blair,	   2002;	   Peters,	   2000;	  
Peters	  and	  Van	  Nispen,	  1998).	   In	  this	  sense,	  Peters	  and	  Van	  Nispen	  (1998)	  refer	  that	  
the	   instrumental	   approach	   has	   stimulated	  many	   scientists	   to	   design	   comprehensive	  
typologies	  of	   policy	   instruments.	  As	   the	   same	  authors	  point	   out	   in	   the	   literature	  we	  
can	   find	   typologies	   by	   Doern	   and	   Phidd	   (1983),	   Hood	   (1983),	   Salamon	   (2002),	   and	  
Vedung	   (1998)	   and	   Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005).	   In	   this	   literature	   review	   we	   will	  
primarily	  consider	  the	  Weimer	  and	  Vining	  typology;	  probably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  quoted	  
and	   broader	   typologies	   of	   policy	   instruments,	   which	   the	   authors	   define	   as	   generic	  
policies.	  	  
Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  group	  the	  policy	  tools	  in	  five	  general	  categories:	  i)	  freeing,	  
facilitating	  and	  simulating	  markets;	  ii)	  subsidies	  and	  taxes	  to	  alter	  incentives;	  iii)	  rules;	  
iv)	  nonmarket	  mechanisms;	  and	  v)	  insurance	  and	  cushions.	  In	  the	  following	  paragraphs	  
I	  summarize	  this	  specific	  policy	  tools,	  considering	  the	  different	  categories	  within	  each	  
of	  these	  groups.	  
	  
Group	  I:	  Freeing,	  Facilitating	  and	  Simulating	  Markets	  
The	   first	   group	   of	   policy	   tools	   identified	   by	  Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   encompasses	  
market	  mechanisms,	   i.e.,	   it	   advocates	   that	  markets	  offer	   the	  potential	   for	   efficiently	  
allocating	  goods,	  but	  only	   if	   there	   is	  no	   inherent	  market	  failure.	   In	  this	  situation,	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  market	  exchange	  between	  private	  citizens	  and	  firms	   in	  
dealing	  with	  policy	  problems;	  the	  governments	  must	  adopt	  an	  active	  role	   in	  enabling	  
the	   market	   to	   function.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   authors	   identified	   three	   types	   of	   market	  
mechanisms:	  freeing	  markets,	  facilitating	  markets	  and	  simulating	  markets.	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Freeing	   regulated	   markets	   assumes,	   unlike	   facilitating	   markets,	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
market	  with	  relatively	  minor	  efficiencies.	  In	  others	  words,	  government	  intervention	  is	  
eliminated.	   The	   process	   of	   freeing	   markets	   has	   an	   underlying	   wide	   range	   of	  
terminology.	   The	   authors	   consider	   deregulation	   has	   the	   most	   general	   term	   and	  
distinguish	   among	   deregulation,	   legalization	   and	   privatization.	   It’s	   very	   natural	   that	  
government	   engaged	   on	   price,	   entry	   and	   exit	   regulation	   of	   competitive	   markets.	  
However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  identify	  various	  forms	  of	  government	  failure,	  particularly	  
legislators	   responding	   to	   rent	   seeking	   by	   industries.	   In	   this	   context,	   market	  
deregulation	   is	   needed	   to	   eliminate	   or	   simplify	   government	   controls,	   rules	   or	  
regulations	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  free	  and	  efficient	  market.	  In	  turn,	   legalization	  refers	  
to	  freeing	  a	  market	  by	  removing	  criminal	  sanctions.	  The	  most	  visible	  examples	  are	  the	  
legalization	  of	  a	  prostitution	  and	  drug	  markets.	  In	  these	  situations	  the	  government	  can	  
also	   generate	   new	   sources	   of	   tax	   revenues.	   Finally,	   the	   freeing	   of	   private	   markets	  
assumes	  either	  denationalization,	  the	  selling	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  to	  the	  private	  
sector,	   or	   demonopolization,	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	   government	   reduces	   or	  
eliminates	   restrictions	   that	   prevent	   private	   firms	   from	   competing	   with	   government	  
bureaus	  or	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  
Facilitating	  markets,	   as	   the	   authors	   denote,	   presumes	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   functioning	  
market	   by	   either	   establishing	   property	   rights	   to	   existing	   goods	   or	   creating	   new	  
marketable	   goods.	   	   The	   allocation	   of	   property	   rights	   is	   justified	   in	   contexts	   of	   free	  
public	   goods	   that	   can	   lead	   to	   an	   inefficient	   open-­‐access	   situation	   (open	   access	  
resources).	  Tenuous	  property	  rights	  promote	  negative	  externalities	  because	  either	  the	  
rights	   to	  exclusive	  use	  are	   incompletely	   specified	  or	   the	  costs	  of	  enforcing	   the	   rights	  
are	  high	  relative	  to	  the	  benefits.	  In	  these	  situations,	  the	  government	  should	  delineate	  
property	  rights	  that	  allow	  private	  transactions	  to	  eliminate	  the	  economic	   inefficiency	  
and,	   consequently,	   promote	   a	   more	   efficient	   use	   of	   such	   goods.	   For	   its	   part,	   the	  
government	   can	   also	   create	   new	   marketable	   goods.	   The	   most	   common	   example	   is	  
tradable	  permits.	  These	  goods	  address	   the	  commons	  problem	  by	   rationing	  access	   to	  
the	  resource	  and	  privatizing	  the	  resulting	  access	  rights.	  The	  first	  step	  involves	  setting	  a	  
limit	  on	  user	  access	  to	  the	  resource.	  This	  limit	  defines	  the	  aggregate	  amount	  of	  access	  
to	  the	  resource	  that	  is	  authorized.	  Depending	  on	  the	  specific	  system	  these	  rights	  may	  
be	  transferable	  to	  other	  users	  and/or	  bankable	  for	  future	  use.	  Users	  who	  exceed	  limits	  
imposed	  by	  the	  rights	  they	  hold	  face	  penalties	  up	  to	  and	  including	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  right	  
to	  participate	  (Tietenberg,	  2002).	  	  
Finally,	  simulating	  markets.	  As	  Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  pointed	  out	  that	  simulation	  
occurs	  when	   efficient	  markets	   cannot	   operate	   but	   government	   can	   simulate	  market	  
processes.	  The	  most	  visible	  example	  is	  auctioning	  and	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  provision	  
of	   goods	  with	   natural	  monopoly	   features	   and	   also	   in	   the	   allocation	   of	   rights	   for	   the	  
exploitation	  of	  publicly	  owned	  natural	  resources.	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Therefore,	  freeing,	  facilitating	  and	  simulating	  markets	  are	  efficient	  tools	  in	  absence	  of	  
market	   failure.	   However,	   they	   can	   prove	   insufficient	   if	   market	   failure	   pervasive	   or	  
other	   values	   are	   important	   besides	   the	   efficiency.	   In	   these	   cases,	   a	   more	  
interventionist	  approach	  is	  required	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Group	  II:	  Subsidies	  and	  Taxes	  to	  alter	  incentives	  
The	  second	  group	  of	  policy	  instruments	  is	  composed	  of	  subsidies	  and	  taxes.	  They	  aim	  
to	  induce	  behaviour	  rather	  than	  command	  it.	  This	  group,	  unlike	  the	  first	  one,	  presumes	  
a	  more	  interventionist	  approach	  by	  the	  government.	  Subsidies	  and	  taxes	  are	  market-­‐
compatible	   forms	  of	  direct	  government	   intervention	   (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  The	  
authors	  state	  subsidies	  and	  taxes	  that	  change	  incentives	  by	  altering	  the	  relative	  prices	  
of	  goods.	  In	  others	  words,	  they	  consider	  the	  use	  of	  taxes	  to	  raise	  the	  private	  costs	  of	  
goods	   or	   services	   that	   are	   too	   abundant	   from	   the	   social	   perspective	   and	   the	   use	   of	  
subsidies	  to	  lower	  the	  private	  costs	  of	  goods	  or	  services	  that	  are	  too	  scarce	  from	  the	  
social	   perspective.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   authors	   divide	   subsidies	   and	   taxes	   into	   four	  
general	  types:	  i)	  supply-­‐side	  taxes;	  ii)	  supply-­‐side	  subsidies;	  iii)	  demand-­‐side	  taxes	  and	  
iv)	  demand-­‐side	  subsidies.	  	  
The	   supply-­‐side	   taxes	   incorporate	   two	   categories:	   output	   taxes	   and	   tariffs.	   The	   first	  
instrument	   is	   commonly	   used	   to	   solve	   negative	   externality	   problems.	  When	  Coasian	  
market	   solutions	   are	   not	   possible,	   government	   intervention	   is	   desirable	   to	   balance	  
marginal	   social	   benefits	   and	   costs.	   The	   idea	   that	   an	   appropriate	   tax	   leads	   to	   an	  
efficient	  internalization	  of	  a	  negative	  externality	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  Pigou	  and	  is	  often	  
referred	   to	   as	   the	   Pigouvian	   tax	   solution.	   These	   taxes	   allow	   firms	   or	   consumers	   to	  
choose	  how	  much	   to	   reduce	  production	  or	   consumption	   to	   limit	   their	   tax	   payments	  
(Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	  Markiw	   (2009)	   pointed	   out	   two	   reasons	   that	   justify	   the	  
popularity	  of	  the	  Pigouvian	  tax.	  First,	  they	  are	  often	  the	  least	  invasive	  way	  to	  correct	  a	  
market	  failure.	  They	  can	  restore	  an	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  resources	  without	  requiring	  a	  
harsher	  government	  intervention	  into	  the	  specific	  decisions	  made	  by	  households	  and	  
firms.	  Second,	  they	  raise	  revenue	  that	  the	  government	  can	  use	  to	  reduce	  other	  taxes.	  	  
Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  define	  tariffs	  as	  a	  form	  of	  tax	  on	  imported,	  and	  occasionally	  
exported,	   goods.	   The	  most	   common	  argument	   that	   justifies	   the	  use	  of	   tariffs	   is	   that	  
there	  are	  positive	  externalities	   from	  protecting	   a	   fledgling	   industry.	   The	  argument	   is	  
that	  a	  domestic	   industry	  can	  have	  a	  potential	  comparative	  advantage	  that	  cannot	  be	  
initially	  internalized	  due	  to	  the	  mobility	  of	  production	  factors.	  
Supply-­‐side	   subsidies	   are	   applied	   in	   situations	   where	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   increase	   the	  
supply	  of	  specific	  goods.	  These	  can	  assume	  a	  form	  of	  tax	  expenditures	  or	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid	  
and	   are	   used	   to	   internalize	   positive	   externalities.	   In	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   positive	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externality,	   an	   appropriately	   defined	   subsidy	   to	   the	   supplier	   generates	   an	   increased	  
supply	   of	   the	   good,	   reducing	   the	   undersupply	   caused	   by	   the	   externality	   and,	  
consequently,	  improving	  social	  welfare	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
The	  authors	  define	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid	  as	  a	  subsidy	  used	  by	  central	  government	  to	  induce	  a	  
local	  government	  to	  supply	  more	  of	  a	  specific	  public	  good.	  Besides	  that,	  subsidies	  can	  
also	   be	   used	   to	   internalize	   a	   negative	   externality,	   i.e.,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   pay	   firms	   to	  
reduce	   the	   level	   of	   the	  externality	   itself.	  However,	   these	   subsidies	   are	   vulnerable	   to	  
opportunistic	  behaviour	  of	   suppliers	  because	   the	   firms	  have	  an	   incentive	   to	   increase	  
their	  own	  level	  of	  externality.	  Finally,	  the	  subsidies	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  solve	  a	  natural	  
monopoly	   market	   failure.	   Functioning	   as	   an	   alterative	   to	   auctions	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
stimulate	   the	  natural	  monopoly	   to	   price	   efficiently	   by	   providing	   a	   subsidy	   that	   gives	  
the	  monopolist	  a	  positive	  rate	  of	  return	  (Depoorter,	  1999;	  Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
The	   tax	   expenditures	   are	   described	   by	  Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   as	   deductions	   to	  
taxable	   income	   and	   credits	   against	   taxes	   otherwise	   owed	   under	   corporate	   income	  
taxes.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Burman	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  the	  term	  tax	  expenditure	  refers	  to	  
departures	   from	   the	   normal	   tax	   structure	   designed	   to	   favour	   a	   particular	   industry,	  
activity,	   or	   class	   of	   persons.	   This	   kind	   of	   subsidy	   is	   useful	   to	   solve	   public	   goods	  
problems	   associated	  with	   certain	   aspects	   of	   research	   and	   development	   and	   positive	  
externalities	   (Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	   The	   authors	   consider	   that	   research	   and	  
development	  have	  public	  goods	   features	  and	  are	   supplied	  at	   inefficient	   levels	  unless	  
government	  subsidizes	  these	  activities	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  raise	  them	  to	  a	  social	  optimum	  
level.	  	  
Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   divide	   demand-­‐side	   taxes	   into	   two	   principal	   categories:	  
commodity	  taxes	  and	  user	  fees.	  Commodity	  taxes	  are	  used	  to	  internalize	  the	  impacts	  
of	  goods	  with	  negative	  externalities	   (Pirttilä	  and	  Tuomala,	  1997;	  Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  
2005).	   The	  main	   idea	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	   consumption	  of	  demerit	   goods	   like	  alcohol	  or	  
tobacco	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  User	  fees	  (or	  congestion	  taxes)	  consist	  in	  marginal	  
social	  cost	  pricing	  and	  are	  used	  to	  internalize	  negative	  externalities	  and	  to	  price	  public	  
goods,	  specifically	   in	   the	  context	  of	  nonrivalrous,	  excludable,	  congested	  public	  goods	  
and	  open-­‐access	  resources	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
Lastly,	  as	  Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  denote,	  demand-­‐side	  subsidies,	  unlike	  supply-­‐side	  
subsidies,	  are	  applied	  in	  situations	  where	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  increase	  the	  consumption	  
of	  specific	  goods	  by	  reducing	  their	  prices	  to	  final	  consumers.	  The	  authors	  identify	  two	  
main	  categories:	  vouchers	  and	  tax	  expenditures.	  The	  main	  argument	  for	  government	  
intervention	   is	   a	   concern	   with	   positive	   externalities.	   Vouchers	   allow	   selected	  
consumers	  to	  purchase	  marketed	  goods	  at	  reduced	  prices	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  
In	   the	  same	  vein,	  Bradford	  and	  Shaviro	   (1999)	  define	  vouchers	  as	   subsidies	  assigned	  
for	   particular	   commodities	   such	   as	   education,	   day	   care,	   food	   and	   nutrition,	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environmental	  protection	  and	  housing.	  Tax	  expenditures,	  unlike	  supply-­‐side	  subsidies,	  
are	   frequently	   used	   to	   motivate	   individual	   demand	   for	   housing,	   education,	   medical	  
care	   and	   childcare.	   The	  main	   idea	   is	   lowering	   the	   after-­‐tax	   price	   of	   a	   specific	   good	  
(Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
In	   short,	   subsidies	   and	   taxes	   are	   efficient	   tools	   to	   solve	   market	   failures	   in	   which	  
government	   intervention	   is	   crucial.	   The	   principal	   argument	   is	   to	   induce	   behaviour	  
rather	   than	   control	   it.	   The	   policy	   tools	   that	   have	   as	   a	   main	   goal	   to	   command	   the	  
individual’s	  behaviour	  are	  the	  so-­‐called	  rules	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
 
Group	  III:	  Rules	  
The	   third	   group	   of	   policy	   tools	   documented	   by	   Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   is	   the	  
establishment	  of	  rules,	  i.e.,	  tools	  that	  governments	  use	  to	  coerce	  individual	  behaviour.	  
The	   authors	   divide	   rules	   into	   two	   types:	   framework	   rules,	   which	   include	   both	   civil	  
(especially	   liability	  rules)	  and	  criminal	   law;	  and	  regulations,	  encompassing	  restrictions	  
on	   price,	   quantity,	   direct	   information	   provision	   and	   indirect	   controls	   relating	   the	  
registration,	  certification,	  and	  licensing	  of	  market	  participants.	  	  
Frameworks	   rules	   simplify	  private	   choice	   in	   competitive	  markets	  and	  can	  be	  used	   to	  
solve	  problems	  associated	  with	  market	  failures.	  Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  suggest	  that	  
a	  competitive	  market	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  property	  rights	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  public	  
goods	   that	   will	   be	   undersupplied	   if	   left	   exclusively	   to	   private	   activity.	   In	   this	   sense,	  
contract	   law,	   tort	   law,	   commercial	   law,	   labour	   law	   and	   antitrust	   law	   are	   framework	  
rules,	  which	   direct	  markets	   to	   an	   efficient	   allocation.	   A	   tort	   law	   system	   can	   also	   be	  
usefully	  to	  solve	  problems	  of	  asymmetric	  information.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Cherry	  (1999)	  
and	  Singh	  (2002)	  when	  the	  product	  market	  is	  competitive	  and	  consumers	  have	  perfect	  
information	  about	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  product,	  market	  relationships	  between	  
consumers	   and	   firms	   will	   ensure	   efficient	   outcomes.	   The	   price	   of	   the	   product	   will	  
adjust	   to	   reflect	   the	   equilibrium	   residual	   risk	   and	   the	   liability.	   However,	   when	  
consumers	   are	   imperfectly	   informed	   about	   the	   product	   related	   risk,	   market	  
mechanisms	  alone	  will	  not	   lead	  to	  efficient	  outcomes	  and	  tort	   liability	   is	  required	  for	  
efficiency.	   In	   the	   same	   vein,	  Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   denote	   that	   in	   situations	   of	  
information	   asymmetry,	   a	   tort	   system	   lowers	   the	   expected	   loss	   that	   consumers	  
experience	   from	  collateral	  damage	  and	  prevents	  some	  risky	  behaviour	  by	  producers.	  
Finally,	  a	  civil	  and	  criminal	  system	  is	  suitable	  to	  address	  negative	  externalities	  (Weimer	  
and	  Vining,	  2005).	  As	  Rubin	  (2005)	  denotes	  tort	  law	  and	  criminal	  law	  protect	  property	  
rights	  from	  intentional	  or	  unintentional	  harm.	  The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  these	  laws	  is	  to	  
induce	   potential	   tortfeasors	   or	   criminals	   to	   internalize	   the	   external	   costs	   of	   their	  
actions.	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Regulations	   seek	   to	   alter	   choices	   that	   producers	   and	   consumers	   would	   make	   in	  
competitive	  markets.	  Normally	   they	  operate	   through	  command	  and	  control	   (Weimer	  
and	  Vining,	  2005).	  Price	  regulation	  is	  employed	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  avoid	  natural	  monopolies	  
from	   charging	   rent-­‐maximizing	   prices	   (Depoorter,	   1999;	   Joskow,	   2005;	  Weimer	   and	  
Vining,	  2005).	  The	  authors	  mention	  that	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  price	  regulation	  is	  that	  there	  
are	   costly	   market	   failures	   whose	   social	   costs	   can	   be	   mitigated	   by	   implementing	  
appropriate	   government	   regulatory	   mechanisms	   and,	   consequently,	   by	   inducing	  
allocative	  and	  productive	  efficiency.	  	  
The	   regulation	   of	   quantities	   represents	   another	   form	   of	   regulation	   (Hepburn,	   2006;	  
Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  Hepburn	  (2006)	  refers	  that	  this	  includes	  quotas,	  targets,	  or	  
specific	  commands,	  such	  as	  a	  regulation	  banning	  an	  activity.	  This	  kind	  of	  tools	  is	  helpful	  
to	  correct	  market	  failures	  caused	  by	  negative	  externalities	  and	  public	  goods	  (Weimer	  
and	  Vining,	  2005).	  As	  Hepburn	  (2006)	  denotes	  when	  public	  goods	  are	  free	  at	  the	  point	  
of	   use	   (open	   access	   resources)	   demand	   will	   often	   exceed	   supply	   with	   services	  
becoming	   rationed.	   The	   author	   states	   that	   this	   rationing	   may	   be	   quite	   deliberate.	  
Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   argue	   that	   quantity	   regulation	   is	   desirable	   in	   situations	  
where	   the	   cost	   of	   error	   is	   great.	   If	   an	   externality	   involves	   a	   good	   with	   potentially	  
catastrophic	   or	   irreversible	   consequences,	   directly	   limiting	   it	   may	   be	   the	   most	  
desirable	  approach.	  	  
Direct	   information	   provision	   through	   disclosure	   and	   labeling	   is	   another	   kind	   of	  
regulation	   (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  This	   is	  a	  viable	   response	   to	   situations	  of	  pure	  
information	  asymmetry.	  It	  is	  an	  attractive	  policy	  solution	  because	  the	  marginal	  costs	  of	  
both	   providing	   the	   information	   and	   enforcing	   compliance	   tend	   to	   be	   low.	  
Governments	  tend	  to	  engage	  in	  either	  direct	  supply	  of	  information	  to	  consumers	  or	  by	  
requiring	   suppliers	   to	   provide	   the	   information	   themselves.	   Subsequently,	   Petrakis,	  
Sartzetakis	   and	   Xepapadeas	   (2005)	   and	  Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	   argue	   that	   direct	  
information	   can	   also	   solve	   negative	   externalities	   associated	   with	   information	  
asymmetry	  distortions.	  
Finally,	  the	  last	  type	  of	  regulation	  is	  the	  indirect	  information	  provision.	  This	  category	  of	  
regulation	  is	  applied	  to	  provide	  information	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  services,	  which	  is	  not	  
available	   through	  direct	   provision;	   as	   the	   quality	   of	   services	   is	   not	   fixed,	   it	   becomes	  
necessary	   to	   search	   for	   indirect	   forms	  of	  providing	   information	   (Weimer	   and	  Vining,	  
2005).	  The	  authors	  present	  licensing	  or	  certification	  as	  the	  common	  policy	  approaches	  
to	   provide	   information	   about	   service	   quality.	   Like	   direct	   information,	   indirect	  
information	   provision	   is	   also	   useful	   to	   solve	   market	   failures	   caused	   by	   asymmetric	  
information	  and	  negative	  externalities	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	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In	   conclusion,	   rules	   are	   the	  most	   pervasive	   form	  of	   government	   policy	   in	   society.	   In	  
fact,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   about	   the	   importance	   of	   government	   regulation	   of	   direct	   or	  
indirect	  providers	  of	  good	  and	  service	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Group	  IV:	  Nonmarket	  Mechanisms	  
Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  allude	  that	  this	  specific	  group	  of	  policy	  tools	  encompasses	  
alternative	   forms	   of	   nonmarket	   mechanisms,	   i.e.,	   governments	   can	   supply	   goods	  
directly	   by	   bureaus,	   or	   indirectly	   by	   independent	   agencies	   or	   several	   forms	   of	  
contracting	  out	  (direct	  or	  indirect	  contracting	  out).	  
The	   authors	   point	   out	   that	   direct	   production	   of	   goods	   or	   services	   by	   bureaus,	   for	  
example	   facilitating	   commerce,	   managing	   public	   lands,	   laws	   and	   justice	   or	   social	  
services	   is	  as	  old	  as	  government	   itself.	   In	   this	   sense,	  much	  of	   this	  production	  can	  be	  
justified	   by	   some	   market	   failures,	   including	   public	   goods,	   positive	   externalities	   and	  
natural	  monopolies.	   The	  welfare	   economics	   argument	   is	   still	   the	   same:	   government	  
intervention	  aims	  to	  improve	  economic	  efficiency.	  
As	   we	   already	   mentioned,	   the	   independent	   agencies	   represent	   an	   indirect	   form	   of	  
production.	  Weimer	  and	  Vining	   (2005)	  divide	   them	   into	   two	   categories:	   government	  
corporations	  and	  special	  districts.	  The	  authors	  consider	  that	  government	  corporations	  
generally	  operate	  with	  their	  own	  sources	  of	  revenue	  under	  a	  charter	  that	  gives	  them	  
some	   independence	   from	   legislative	   or	   executive	   interference	   in	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  
operations.	  Becker	  (2008)	  defines	  government	  corporations	  as	  entities	  created	  by	  the	  
government	  to	  provide	  a	  public	  good	  or	  service;	  they	  are	  legally	  a	  private	  organization	  
with	   unique	   connections	   to	   the	   government.	   Some	   are	   private	   corporations	   wholly	  
owned	   by	   the	   government,	   others	   are	   only	   partially	   owned	   by	   the	   government	   and	  
some	   of	   them	   are	   not	   owned	   by	   the	   government	   at	   all.	   As	   pointed	   out	   by	   Becker	  
(2008)	   and	  Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005),	   government	   corporations	   tend	   to	   be	   used	   in	  
sectors	   in	   which	   natural	   monopoly	   and	   positive	   externalities	   suggest	   the	   need	   for	  
government	  intervention.	  	  
Concerning	   special	   districts,	   Scutelnicu	   (2010)	   defines	   them	  as	   independent,	   special-­‐
purpose	   units	   of	   local	   government	   that	   have	   administrative	   and	   financial	  
independence	   from	   general-­‐purpose	   governments	   such	   as	   counties	   and	   cities.	   In	   a	  
similar	  vein,	  Foster	   (1997)	  defines	   special	  districts	  as	  autonomous	   local	  governments	  
that	   provide	   one	   or	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   public	   services.	  Weimer	   and	   Vining	   (2005)	  
describe	  them	  as	  single-­‐purpose	  government	  entities	  that	  usually	  are	  created	  to	  supply	  
goods	   that	   are	   believed	   to	   have	   natural	   monopoly,	   public	   goods,	   or	   negative	  
externalities	  characteristics	  (Scutelnicu,	  2010).	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Finally,	  Weimer	  and	  Vining	  (2005)	  designate	  the	  tool	  of	  contracting	  out	  (privatization)	  
as	   a	   form	   where	   private	   firms	   became	   responsible	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   good	   or	  
service	  that	  was	  previously	  produced	  by	  a	  government	  bureau.	  The	  authors	  consider	  
two	   different	   forms	   of	   contracting	   out:	   governments	   can	   contract	   out	   to	   for-­‐profit	  
firms	   or	   they	   can	   contract	   out	   for	   services	   provided	   by	   non-­‐profit	   organizations	  
(indirect	   contracting	   out).	  Direct	   contracting	   out	   is	   a	   reasonable	   instrument	   to	   solve	  
public	   good	  market	   failures	  whereas	   indirect	   contracting	   is	   usefully	   to	   solve	  positive	  
externalities.	  	  
In	   sum,	   these	   tools	   represent	   alternative	   forms	   of	   nonmarket	   supply.	   Finally,	  
government	   interventions	   can	  also	  provide	  protections	   against	  misfortune	  using	  one	  
last	  group	  of	  policy	  instruments:	  insurance	  and	  cushions	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  
	  
Group	  V:	  Insurance	  and	  Cushions	  
This	   last	   group	  of	  policy	   tools	   is	  divided	   into	   two	  categories:	   insurance	  and	  cushions	  
(Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	   The	   insurance	   is	   an	   agreement	   where,	   for	   a	   stipulated	  
payment	  called	  the	  premium,	  one	  party	  agrees	  to	  pay	  to	  the	  other	  a	  defined	  amount	  
upon	   the	  occurrence	  of	   a	   specific	   loss	   (Anderson	  and	  Brown,	   2005).	  As	  Weimer	   and	  
Vining	   (2005)	   refer	   the	   insurance	   consists	   in	   the	   reduction	  of	   individual	   risk	   through	  
pooling.	  The	  authors	   identified	  two	  categories	  of	   insurance:	  mandatory	  or	  subsidized	  
insurance.	   They	   also	   argue	   that,	   in	   considering	   adverse	   selection,	  moral	   hazard,	   and	  
limited	  experience	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  incomplete	  insurance	  markets,	  government	  has	  an	  
important	   role	   in	   some	   insurance	   markets	   because	   insurances	   can	   be	   used	   in	  
conjunction	   with	   liability	   laws	   to	   deal	   with	   problems	   caused	   of	   asymmetric	  
information.	  This	  is	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  subsidized	  insurance.	  Government	  can	  provide	  
insurance	   subsidized	   premiums	   when	   myopia,	   error,	   or	   other	   factors	   appear	   to	   be	  
promoting	  underconsumption	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  	  
Finally,	   cushions	   are	   also	   considered	   as	   a	   policy	   tool.	   Although	   it	   is	   not	   applied	   in	  
market	   failure	   resolution	   we	   find	   it	   coherent	   to	   make	   reference	   to	   this	   type	   of	  
instrument.	  Unlike	  insurances,	  with	  cushions	  individuals	  receive	  ex	  post	  compensation	  
for	  unfavourable	  outcomes	  that	  occur	  (Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005).	  The	  authors	  divide	  
them	  into	  three	  categories:	  stockpiling,	  transitional	  assistance	  or	  cash	  grants.	  	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  highlight	  the	  diversity	  of	  policy	  tools	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
address	  market	  failures.	  Table	  2	  summarizes	  the	  main	  instruments	  within	  each	  of	  the	  
five	  groups	  and	  the	  perceived	  market	  failure	  that	  generic	  policies	  might	  appropriately	  
address.	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Table	  2	  –	  Generic	  Policies	  and	  Perceived	  Market	  failures	  	  
Policy	  Tools	   Perceived	  Market	  Failure	  
GROUP	  I	  
Freeing	  markets	  	  
Deregulate	   No	  market	  failure	  	  
Legalize	   No	  market	  failure	  	  
Privatize	   No	  market	  failure	  	  
Facilitating	  markets	  	   Allocate	  through	  property	  rights	  	   Negative	  externalities	  Public	  goods	  (open	  access	  resources)	  New	  marketable	  goods	  
Simulating	  Markets	  	   Auctions	  	   Natural	  monopolies	  Public	  goods	  
GROUP	  II	  
Supply-­‐side	  Taxes	   Output	  taxes	   Negative	  externalities	  
Tariffs	   Positive	  externalities	  
Supply-­‐side	  Subsidies	   Grant-­‐an-­‐aid	  	   Positive	  externalities	  Public	  goods	  Tax	  expenditure	  	  
Demand-­‐side	  Taxes	  
Commodity	  taxes	   Negative	  externalities	  
Information	  asymmetries	  User	  fees	  
Demand-­‐side	  Subsidies	  
Vouchers	  	   Positive	  externalities	  	  
Tax	  expenditures	   Positive	  externalities	  
GROUP	  III	  
Frameworks	  	  
Civil	  laws	  (Tort	  liability)	  	   Negative	  externalities	  	  
Information	  asymmetries	  
Public	  goods	  
Criminal	  laws	   Negative	  externalities	  	  
Public	  goods	  
Regulations	  	  
Price	  regulation	   Natural	  monopolies	  
Quantity	  regulation	   Negative	  externalities	  
Public	  goods	  (open	  access	  resources)	  
Direct	  information	  provision	   Negative	  externalities	  	  
Information	  asymmetries	  Indirecto	  information	  provision	  
GROUP	  IV	  
Direct	  Supply	  
Bureaus	  	   Public	  goods	  
Positive	  externalities	  
Natural	  monopolies	  
Independent	  Agencies	  
Government	  corporations	   Natural	  monopolies	  
Positive	  externalities	  
Special	  districts	   Natural	  monopolies	  
Local	  public	  goods	  
Negative	  externalities	  
Contracting	  Out	  	  
Direct	  Contracting	  Out	   Public	  goods	  (local	  public	  goods)	  
Indirect	  Contacting	  Out	  	   Positive	  externalities	  
GROUP	  V	  
Insurance	   Mandatory	  insurance	   No	  market	  failure	  Subsidized	  insurance	   Information	  asymmetries	  
Cushions	  	  
Stockpiling	   No	  market	  failure	  
Transitional	  assistance	   No	  market	  failure	  
Cash	  grants	  	   No	  market	  failure	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005	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Attending	   the	   information	   above	   explicit,	   it	   is	   possible	   conclude	   that	   several	   policy	  
tools	  exist	  that	  are	  mostly	  likely	  to	  provide	  potential	  solutions	  for	  each	  type	  of	  market	  
failure.	   In	  many	  cases,	  more	   than	  one	  policy	   tool	   can	  provide	  potential	   solutions	   for	  
the	   same	   problem	   (Weimer	   and	   Vining,	   2005).	   However,	   these	   solutions	   are	   never	  
perfect;	  they	  must	  be	  personalized	  to	  the	  concrete	  situations	  and	  evaluated	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  relevant	  goals.	  Table	  3	  reviews	  this	  diversity	  of	  solutions.	  	  
	  
Table	  3	  –	  Generic	  Solutions	  to	  Market	  Failures	  
Policy	  Tools	  	  
Market	  Failures	  
Market	  
Mechanism	  
Incentives	   Rules	  
Nonmarket	  
mechanism	  
Insurance	  and	  
Cushions	  
Public	  goods	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   	  
Externalities	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   	  
Natural	  Monopolies	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	   	  
Information	  
Asymmetries	  	  
	   	   ✔	   ✔	   ✔	  
✔ -­‐	  Possible	  solution	  	  	  	                                                Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Weimer	  and	  Vining,	  2005	  
	  
In	   conclusion,	   as	   we	   previously	   mentioned,	   the	   policy	   tools	   approach	   acquired	   a	  
significant	   importance	   in	   the	   context	   of	  mitigating	   problems	   associated	  with	  market	  
failures.	   In	  this	  sense,	  this	  approach	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  various	  areas,	  among	  which	  
we	   can	   find	   tourism	  policy	   (Bramwell,	   2005;	  Dimitris,	  Aimilia	   and	  George,	   2005;	  Hall	  
and	  Jenkins,	  1997;	  Jordan,	  Wurzel	  and	  Zito,	  2005;	  Logar,	  2010;	  Prideaux,	  2005;	  Scott,	  
2011;	  Zito,	  Radaelli	  and	  Jordan,	  2003).	  The	  next	  section	  reviews	  the	  main	  arguments	  
that	   address	   tourism	   as	   an	   activity	   subject	   to	   market	   failures	   and,	   consequently,	  
requires	  government	  intervention	  using	  different	  policy	  tools.	  	  
	  
3.	  THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  	  
Many	  different	  authors	  and	  institutions	  have	  highlighted	  different	  concepts	  of	  Tourism	  
(Blake	  and	  Sinclair,	  2007).	  However,	  the	  most	  common	  definition	  used	  internationally	  
was	  devised	  by	  the	  World	  Tourism	  Organisation,	  which	  defines	  tourism	  as	  the	  activities	  
of	   a	   person	   travelling	   outside	   his	   or	   her	   usual	   environment	   for	   less	   than	   a	   specified	  
period	  of	  time	  and	  whose	  main	  purpose	  of	  travel	  is	  other	  than	  to	  exercise	  an	  activity	  
remunerated	  from	  the	  place	  visited	  (World	  Tourism	  Organization,	  1991).	  	  
In	   this	   sense,	   it	   is	  not	  surprising	  and	   it	   is	  widely	   recognized	   the	   involvement	  and	  the	  
role	   that	   governments,	   at	   different	   levels,	   play	   in	   tourism	   development	   and	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management.	  Scott	  (2011)	  claims	  that	  besides	  the	  importance	  of	  tourism	  activity	  it	   is	  
also	  true	  that	  governments	  are	  interested	  in	  tourism	  because	  it	  constitutes	  an	  activity	  
with	  economic,	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Blake	  and	  Sinclair	  
(2007)	   and	   Sinclair	   (1998)	   emphasize	   that	   tourism	   activity	   has	   an	   important	   role	   in	  
economic	  development.	  Tourism	  has	  become	  a	  major	  economic	  activity	  with	  positive	  
contributions,	  such	  as	  for	  example	  the	  provision	  of	  hard	  currency	  to	  alleviate	  a	  foreign	  
exchange	  gap	  and	  to	  finance	  imports	  of	  capital	  goods;	  the	  expansion	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  
full-­‐time	  and	  part-­‐time	  jobs,	  in	  gross	  national	  product	  and	  personal	  incomes;	  and	  the	  
provision	  of	  tax	  revenues	  for	  government.	  	  
Blake	   and	   Sinclair	   (2007)	   add	   that	   tourism	   includes	   all	   the	   activities	   that	   tourists	  
undertake,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  makes	  the	  government’s	  role	  in	  tourism	  different	  from	  its	  
role	   in	   other	   industries.	   But,	   what	   are	   the	   goals	   of	   these	   interventions	   in	   tourist	  
markets?	  Why	  do	  governments	  participate	  in	  tourism	  policy?	  Jeffries	  (2001)	  considers	  
six	   explanations	   for	   government	   intervention	   in	   tourism:	   wider	   objectives,	   the	  
importance	  of	  transportation	  policy,	  the	  complexity	  of	  tourism,	  market	  failures,	  public	  
sector	  provision	  of	  leisure	  services	  and	  conflict	  resolution.	  Given	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  this	  
work,	   I	   concentrate	   on	   tourism	   market	   failures	   and,	   subsequently,	   on	   the	   tourism	  
policy	  instruments	  employed	  by	  governments.	  The	  analysis	  of	  tourism	  market	  failures	  
and	  policy	  tools	  is	  mainly	  based	  on	  efficiency	  criteria.	  In	  other	  words,	  and	  considering	  
Musgrave	  (1939)1	  and	  Peterson’s	  (1981)2	  typologies,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  view	  government	  
intervention	   in	   tourism	  activity	   as	   an	  allocation/affectation	   function.	   In	  other	  words,	  
government	   intervenes	   in	   tourism	   because	   the	   market	   fails	   to	   an	   optimal	   resource	  
allocation.	   	   As	   Candela,	   Figini	   and	   Scorcu	   (2005)	   and	  Whanill	   (2005)	   argue	   tourism	  
activity	  is	  very	  complex	  in	  nature,	  so	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  by	  itself	  is	  unable	  to	  secure	  
economic	   efficiency	   gains,	   which	   requires	   government	   policy	   interventions	   to	   direct	  
the	   market	   towards	   its	   full	   economic	   potential.	   Field	   (1997)	   also	   refers	   that	   the	  
difference	   between	   market	   values	   and	   social	   values	   justifies	   public	   intervention	   to	  
achieve	  social	  efficiency.	  	  
	  
3.1.	  Tourism	  Market	  Failures	  	  
Tourism	  activity	   is	  recognized	  in	   literature	  as	  an	  activity	  that	   is	  particularly	  subject	  to	  
market	  failures,	  including	  the	  traditional	  market	  failures	  identified	  above:	  public	  goods,	  
externalities,	  natural	  monopoly	  and	  asymmetric	  information	  (Aradhyula	  and	  Tronstad,	  
2003;	   Blake	   and	   Sinclair,	   2007;	   Dimitris,	   Aimilia	   and	   George,	   2005;	   Fleischer	   and	  
                                                
1	   Musgrave	   (1939)	   define	   the	   three	   main	   functions	   of	   government	   activity:	   resource	   allocation,	  
macroeconomic	  stabilization,	  and	  income	  redistribution.	  
2	  Peterson	  (1981)	  identifies	  three	  types	  of	  politics:	  the	  politics	  of	  development,	  the	  politics	  of	  allocation	  
and	  the	  politics	  of	  redistribution.	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Felsenstein,	   2000;	   Gooroochurn	   and	   Sinclair,	   2005;	   Jeffries,	   1999;	   Michael,	   2001;	  
Sinclair	  and	  Stabler,	  1997;	  Sinclair,	  1998;	  Sharma,	  2004;	  Veal,	  2002;	  Wanhill,	  2005).	  	  
As	  Michael	  refers	  (2001)	  tourism	  is	  an	  economic	  activity	  more	  predisposed	  than	  other	  
industries	  to	  market	  failures,	  because	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  output	  of	  many	  industries	  to	  
deliver	  its	  own	  product;	  this	  requires	  some	  form	  of	  public	  intervention	  to	  restore	  the	  
parameters	  of	  competition.	  Also	  Fayos-­‐Sola	  (1996)	  considers	  that	  the	  standard	  reasons	  
for	  public	   intervention	   in	   the	  economy	  are	  perfectly	  applicable	   to	   tourism	  activity.	   It	  
would	  be	  difficult	  to	  find	  sectors	  of	  this	  magnitude	  where	  external	  effects	  play	  such	  an	  
important	  role.	  	  
	  
Public	  Goods	  
Public	   goods	   are	   products	   (goods	   or	   services)	   that	   exhibit	   two	   important	  
characteristics:	  non-­‐rivalry	  and	  non-­‐excludability.	  Many	  touristic	  natural	  resources	  are	  
public	   goods	   with	   free	   access	   and	   can	   often	   be	   used	   excessively	   (Sinclair,	   1998).	   In	  
general,	   public	   goods	   must	   therefore	   be	   provided	   or	   managed	   collectively	   in	   some	  
form	   (Blake	   and	   Sinclair,	   2007;	   Veal,	   2002).	   Blake	   and	   Sinclair	   (2007)	   consider	   four	  
aspects	  in	  the	  context	  of	  what	  can	  be	  consider	  tourism	  public	  goods:	  destination	  and	  
national	  promotion,	  infrastructures,	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  planning.	  	  
From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  authors	  the	  destination	  and	  national	  promotion	  suffers	  from	  
being	  a	  public	  good.	  The	  destination	  promotion	  has	  a	  goal	  to	  attract	  more	  tourists	   in	  
the	  region	  and	  that	  will	  mean	  more	  costumers.	  If	  some	  companies	  were	  to	  collectively	  
advertise	   their	   destination	   other	   companies	   would	   be	   able	   to	   free	   ride	   on	   this	  
promotion,	   and	   the	   original	   companies	   would	   have	   no	   incentive	   follow	   such	   a	  
voluntary	  pattern	   (Blake	  and	  Sinclair,	  2007).	  Therefore,	  destination	  promotion	  needs	  
some	   form	  of	   public	   involvement.	   As	   the	   authors	   denote,	   the	   public	   good	   aspect	   of	  
destination	  promotion	  applies	  on	  a	  larger	  scale	  to	  national	  promotion,	  having	  as	  main	  
purpose	   to	   attract	   international	   visitors;	   this	   is	   a	   public	   good	   with	   the	   inherent	  
incentive	  to	  free	  ride	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  promotion	  by	  other	  businesses.	  
Concerning	   the	   infrastructures,	   these	   are	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   tourism	   product	  
(Blake	   and	   Sinclair,	   2007).	   Sakai	   (2006)	   defines	   that	   capital-­‐intensive,	   long-­‐lived	  
physical	   assets	   provide	   benefits	   to	   the	   general	   public	   and	   promote	   economic	  
development.	  She	  discusses	  specific	  types	  of	  infrastructure,	  such	  as	  for	  example,	  roads	  
and	  highways,	  airports,	   convention	  centres,	   stadia	  and	  arenas	  and	  Olympic	   cities.	  As	  
Blake	   and	   Sinclair	   (2007)	   pointed	   out	   the	   private	   sector	   has	   no	   incentive	   to	   provide	  
many	  of	  these	  infrastructures	  since	  they	  are	  non-­‐excludable.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  efficient	  
level	  of	  infrastructure	  provision	  depends	  on	  government	  intervention.	  With	  the	  same	  
purpose,	  Candela,	  Figini	  and	  Scorcu	  (2005)	  underline	  the	  need	  to	  finance	  tourist	  public	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goods,	   namely	   infrastructure	   necessary	   to	   complete	   the	   tourism	   product	   and	   to	  
enhance	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  whole	  destination	  for	  which	  markets	  fail.	  Relatively	  to	  
the	   tourism	   product,	   Gooroochurn	   and	   Sinclair	   (2005)	   and	  Wanhill	   (2005)	   express	   a	  
similar	   idea,	   arguing	   that	   the	   tourism	   product	   (composed	   by	   several	   products	   and	  
services)	   is	  unlikely	   to	  be	  provided	   in	  sufficient	  quantity	  by	  market	  mechanisms.	  The	  
market	  fails	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  items	  within	  the	  tourist	  product	  that	  all	  individuals	  
can	  enjoy	  in	  common	  and	  that	  are	  equally	  available	  to	  all,	  which	  implies	  non-­‐rivalry	  in	  
consumption.	  These	  public	  goods	  also	  have	  feature	  of	  non-­‐excludability,	  resulting	  from	  
the	  lack	  of	  or	  incompleteness	  of	  property	  rights.	  	  
Co-­‐ordination	   represents	   another	   public	   good	   problem,	   since	   these	   services	   are	  
essential	  to	  several	  different	  companies	  that	  supply	  tourism	  (Blake	  and	  Sinclair,	  2007).	  
If	  a	  destination	  is	  to	  develop	  an	  image	  as	  having	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  tourism,	   it	  must	  
co-­‐ordinate	   amongst	   its	   various	   activities	   and	   private	   actors.	   Such	   co-­‐ordination,	   if	  
performed	  by	  a	  private	  company	  would	  be	  non-­‐excludable,	  and	  therefore	  firms	  could	  
benefit	   by	   free	   riding	   on	   the	   benefits	   being	   provided.	   Thus,	   government	   has	  
increasingly	  taken	  on	  the	  role	  of	  developing	  tourism	  products	  and	  marketing	  them,	  a	  
role	   that	   includes	   the	   coordination	   of	   various	   elements	   of	   the	   tourism	   industry	   to	  
support	  a	  change	  in	  the	  product	  offered	  to	  tourists.	  Candela,	  Figini	  and	  Scorcu	  (2005)	  
also	   note	   that	   government	   intervention	   is	   important	   in	   the	   resolution	   of	   potential	  
coordination	   problems	   that	   arise	   when	   private	   firms	   supply	   different	   goods	   and	  
services	  that	  compose	  the	  complete	  tourism	  product.	  	  
Finally,	  long	  term	  planning	  for	  tourism	  also	  possesses	  public	  good	  features	  (Blake	  and	  
Sinclair,	   2007).	   Long-­‐term	   planning	   at	   the	   destination	   cannot	   be	   made	   by	   private	  
companies.	  It	  requires	  a	  body	  that	  can	  reasonably	  and	  believably	  promise	  to	  construct	  
infrastructure	   and	   fund	   marketing	   in	   the	   future	   for	   private	   companies	   to	   want	   to	  
invest.	   Otherwise,	   these	   private	   companies	   are	   unlikely	   to	   invest	   in	   developing	  
accommodation	   and	   other	   service	   facilities	   on	   the	   chance	   that	   another	   private	  
company	  might	  or	  might	  not	  construct	   infrastructure	  and	  fund	  destination	  marketing	  
in	  the	  future	  (Blake	  and	  Sinclair,	  2007).	  
In	   conclusion,	   touristic	   products	   have	   public	   good	   characteristics	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	  
cannot	   be	   provided	   by	   the	   private	   sector.	   If	   heavily	   depend	   on	   market	   adjustment	  
mechanisms,	  tourism	  companies	  will	  not	  produce	  and	  supply	  public	  tourism	  products	  
efficiently.	   Therefore,	   government	   intervention	   is	  needed	   to	   increase	   the	  production	  
and	  supplies	  of	  these	  public	  goods	  (Liang	  and	  Wang,	  2010).	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Externalities	  
In	  addition	  to	  public	  goods,	  many	  scholars	  also	  suggest	  externalities	  as	  market	  failure	  
applied	  to	  tourism	  (Fleischer	  and	  Felsenstein,	  2000;	  Hartley	  and	  Hooper,	  1993;	  Sinclair,	  
1998).	  Externalities,	  or	  external	  effects,	  involve	  either	  a	  benefit	  or	  cost	  being	  incurred	  
by	   a	   third	   party	   due	   to	   a	   decision	   made	   by	   two	   parties	   involved	   in	   a	   voluntary	  
transaction	   (Blake	   and	   Sinclair,	   2007).	   The	   authors	   consider	   that	   the	   economic,	  
environmental	  and	  social	  impacts	  caused	  by	  tourism	  have	  externality	  features.	  
From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  economic	   impact,	   tourism	  expenditures	  on	  promotion	  not	  
only	  have	  direct	  impacts	  on	  the	  firms	  engaged	  in	  these	  promotion	  activities,	  but	  also	  a	  
range	   of	   indirect	   impacts	   on	   all	   the	   firms.	   In	   other	   words,	   when	   a	   firm	   undertakes	  
promotional	   activities,	   it	   attracts	   tourists	   that	  will	   spend	  money	  outside	   that	   firm	  at	  
the	   same	   destination	   with	   additional	   benefits	   to	   others	   firms.	   As	   Blake	   and	   Sinclair	  
(2007)	  refer	  this	  broader	  economic	  impact	  is	  a	  positive	  external	  effect	  to	  the	  firms	  not	  
engaged	  in	  promotional	  activities	  and	  a	  negative	  external	  effect	  to	  the	  firms	  engaged	  
in	   promotional	   activities;	   they	  will	   not	   spend	   as	  much	   as	   they	  would	   if	   the	   benefits	  
accrued	   only	   to	   the	   firm.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   externalities	   lead	   to	   a	   firm’s	   level	   of	  
spending	   on	   promotional	   activities	   that	   is	   below	   the	   social	   optimum;	   positive	  
externalities	  combined	  with	  the	  public	  good	  nature	  of	  destination	  promotion	  justifies	  
public	  sector	   intervention	  to	  correct	  market	   failures	  and	  produce	  efficient	  outcomes.	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  that	  intervention	  the	  level	  of	  promotional	  activities	  in	  tourism	  would	  
be	  considerably	  below	  the	  social	  optimum.	  
Blake	   and	   Sinclair	   (2007)	   also	   make	   reference	   to	   the	   environmental	   impacts	   in	   the	  
tourism	  context.	  The	  authors	  consider	  that	  if	  a	  touristic	  activity	  has	  a	  negative	  impact	  
on	   the	   environment,	   this	   negative	   externality	   requires	   some	   kind	   of	   correction.	  
Tourism	  negative	   social	   impacts,	   such	  as	  an	   increase	   in	  crime	   rates,	   lead	   to	  negative	  
attitudes	   of	   the	   host	   population	   towards	   tourists.	   Liang	   and	  Wang	   (2010)	   and	  Blake	  
and	   Sinclair	   (2007)	   consider	   specifically	   the	   externality	   provoked	   by	   congestion.	   If	  
tourists	   exceed	   a	   certain	   limit,	   they	   tend	   to	  not	   only	   have	   a	  negative	   impact	   on	   the	  
environment	   and	   local	   society	   but	   also	   to	   deter,	   through	   images	   of	   overcrowding,	  
future	  tourists.	  
Additionally,	   Liang	   and	  Wang	   (2010)	  make	   reference	   to	  more	   types	   of	   externalities:	  
crowdedness	   effect	   and	   excessive	   utilization	   of	   common	   pool	   resources3	   and	  
environment	  pollution	  around	  common	  pool	  resources.	  According	  to	  the	  authors,	  self-­‐
                                                
3	  As	  Liang	  and	  Wang	  (2010)	  refer	  Healy	  in	  1994	  was	  the	  first	  to	  introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  “common	  pool”	  
into	  tourism	  studies.	  The	  author	  uses	  property	  rights	  theory	  and	  discusses	  the	  solutions	  to	  the	  dilemma	  
of	   public	   tourist	   attraction	   from	   three	   aspects:	   resource	   privatization,	   government	  management	   and	  
institution	  of	  public	  property	  rights.	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interested	   tourism	  companies	  usually	  will	   not	  decrease	   resource	  use,	  which,	   in	   turn,	  
leads	   to	   an	   unreasonable	   use	   of	   public	   goods.	   Furthermore,	   the	   same	   companies	  
sacrifice	   the	   environment	   in	   exchange	   for	   short-­‐term	   economic	   gains.	   However,	   the	  
cost	  of	  damaging	  the	  environment	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  firm	  cost	  schedule.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Dwyer	  and	  Forsyth	  (1997)	  suggest	  that	  tourism	  can	  create	  undesirable	  
externalities	   that	   could	   affect	   tourism,	   such	   as	   an	   increased	   pressure	   on	   fragile	  
environments,	  unwelcomed	  socio-­‐cultural	  effects,	  road	  congestion	  or	  the	  crowding	  out	  
of	   attractions.	   Veal	   (2002)	   points	   out	   that	   these	   negative	   externalities	   arise	   when	  
facilities,	  such	  as	  pubs,	  nightclubs,	  resorts	  or	  tourist	  traffic	  imposes	  noise	  or	  congestion	  
costs	  on	  neighboring	  properties.	  Dwyer	  and	  Forsyth	  (1997)	  also	  refer	  that	  tourism	  as	  
promoting	  positive	  externalities,	   such	  as	  a	  greater	  consciousness	  of	   the	  environment	  
and	   local	   culture,	   conservation	   of	   human	   man-­‐made	   monuments	   and	   wildlife	  
preservation.	  
In	   short,	   market	   mechanisms	   cannot	   correct	   external	   inefficient	   behaviors	   and	  
effectively	   avoid	   crowded	   externality	   of	   public	   goods	   (Liang	   and	  Wang,	   2010).	   As	   a	  
result,	  government	  intervention	  is	  necessary	  to	  internalize	  the	  impacts	  of	  positive	  and	  
negative	  externalities.	  	  
	  
Natural	  Monopoly	  	  
Market	  power	  exists	  when	  a	  supplier	  of	  a	  product	  can	  exercise	  influence	  on	  the	  price	  it	  
receives	   for	   its	  output	   (Blake	  and	  Sinclair,	   2007).	  One	   specific	   area	  of	  market	  power	  
that	  is	  explicit	  to	  tourism	  is	  that	  of	  market	  power	  in	  export	  markets.	  It	  is	  common	  from	  
a	  tourism	  perspective	  to	  consider	  countries	  either	  as	  mainly	  import	  markets	  or	  mainly	  
export	  markets.	  Countries	  that	  mostly	  export	  receive	  more	  tourists	  (measured	  by	  the	  
amount	   of	   international	   tourism	   receipts)	   than	   the	   residents	   of	   that	   country	   visit	  
another	   countries.	   In	   this	   sense,	   as	   argued	   by	   Blake	   and	   Sinclair	   (2007),	   export	  
countries	  allow	  governments	  to	  extract	  an	  economic	  rent	  from	  the	  market	  power	  they	  
have	   and	   improve	   the	  welfare	   of	   the	   domestic	   economy	   by	   levying	   higher	   taxes	   on	  
tourism	  than	  on	  other	  sectors.	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Gooroochrun	  and	  Sinclair	  (2005)	  state	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  find	  several	  
countries	   that	   have	   some	  monopoly	   power	   over	   international	   tourism.	   Such	  market	  
power	  arises	  because	  of	  the	  differentiated	  nature	  of	  products.	  Liang	  and	  Wang	  (2010)	  
also	   point	   out	   that	   a	   tourist	   attraction	   is	   characterized	   by	   its	   scarcity,	   uniqueness,	  
immobility,	  and	  regional	  differences,	  which	  result	  in	  a	  natural	  monopoly.	  Gooroochrun	  
and	  Sinclair	  (2005)	  refer	  that	  tourism	  product	  differentiation	  occurs	  in	  terms	  of	  types	  
and	  quality	  of	  attractions,	  goods,	  and	  services	   in	  the	  country	  and,	  citing	  Gray	  (1987),	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the	   authors	   mention	   that	   tourism	   that	   involves	   seeing	   or	   doing	   something	   that	   is	  
unique	   to	   the	  destination	   tends	   to	  exhibit	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  product	  differentiation	  
and	  hence	  higher	  market	  power,	  leading	  to	  economic	  rents.	  	  
In	  sum,	  tourism	  activities	  can	  also	  create	  situations	  of	  monopoly	  power.	  As	  Blake	  and	  
Sinclair	   (2007)	  refer	  the	  maker	  power	  that	  can	  exist	  through	  purchasers	  of	  a	  product	  
being	   able	   to	   exert	   influence,	   and	   in	   some	   countries	   the	   ability	   of	   foreign	   tour	  
operators	  and	  travel	  agents	   to	  exert	  downward	  pressure	  on	  the	  prices	   that	   they	  pay	  
for	  accommodation,	  is	  an	  issue	  for	  government	  involvement.	  	  
	  
Asymmetric	  information	  
The	  remaining	  market	  failure	  applied	  to	  the	  tourism	  activity	  is	  information	  asymmetry	  
(Asero	  and	  Patti,	  2009;	  Blake	  and	  Sinclair,	  2007;	  Caccomo	  and	  Solonandrasana,	  2001).	  
As	  stated	  by	  Asero	  and	  Patti	  (2009),	  a	  typical	  asymmetric	  information	  problem	  occurs	  
in	   situations	   where	   one	   economic	   agent	   knows	   something	   that	   another	   economic	  
agent	   does	   not.	   The	   relationship	   between	   sellers	   and	   buyers	   of	   tourist	   products	   is	  
often	   characterized	   by	   asymmetric	   information.	   If	  we	   consider	   that	   tourist	   products	  
are	   comprised	   of	   several	   goods	   and	   services,	   asymmetric	   information	   problems	  
increase.	   In	   fact,	  when	   tourists	   choose	   the	   travel	   package	   they	   can	   face	   asymmetric	  
information.	  At	  the	  moment	  of	  purchase,	  the	  tourist	  does	  not	  know	  what	  will	  happen	  
during	  the	  travel;	  he/she	  can	  only	  trust	  the	  travel	  agent	  or	  tour	  operator.	  Alternatively,	  
the	  tourist	  can	  trust	  a	  well-­‐known	  brand	  and	  its	  reputation	  or	  a	  friend	  to	  ascertain	  the	  
quality	  and	  features	  of	  the	  tourist	  product	  or	  service	  (Asero	  and	  Patti,	  2009).	  How	  can	  
we	  resolve	  the	  asymmetric	  information	  problem?	  The	  authors	  consider	  that	  sellers	  can	  
invest	   in	   quality.	   In	   the	   tourism	   activity,	   quality	   assumes	   a	   relevant	   role	   to	   direct	  
consumer	  choices	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  guarantees	  the	  market.	  This	  argument	  becomes	  
much	   more	   important	   in	   the	   context	   of	   tourism	   products;	   these	   are	   composed	   by	  
packages	   of	   products/services	  whose	   quality	   can	   only	   be	   determined	   in	   part	   by	   the	  
consumer	  in	  advance.	  	  
Caccomo	   and	   Solonandrasana	   (2001)	   also	   present	   a	   paper	   that	   investigates	   the	  
existence	   of	   asymmetric	   information	   in	   context	   of	   tourism	   activities.	   The	   authors	  
conclude	   that	   asymmetric	   information	   generates	   price	   distortions	   between	   tourist	  
products	   that	   have	   similar	   characteristics.	   Liang	   and	   Wang	   (2010)	   consider	   that	  
tourism	  enterprises	  take	  advantage	  of	  more	  complete	  information	  they	  have	  got	  and	  
provide	  false	  information	  or	  obscure	  certain	  details	  to	  damage	  tourists’	  welfare.	  Thus,	  
under	   a	   situation	   of	   information	   asymmetry,	  market	   adjustment	  mechanisms	   fail	   to	  
take	   effect.	   Tourist	   products	   cannot	   be	   allocated	   efficiently	   so	   that	   government	  
involvement	  is	  required.	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Markets	   failures	   applied	   to	   the	   tourism	   context	   characterize	   circumstances	   in	  which	  
the	   market	   fails	   to	   produce	   efficient	   outcomes	   and	   the	   Pareto	   optimum.	   Table	   4	  
reviews	  the	  traditional	  market	  failures	  applied	  to	  the	  context	  of	  tourism.	  	  
	  
Table	  4	  –	  Tourism	  Market	  Failures	  	  
Tourism	  	  
Market	  Failure	   Examples	  	  
Public	  Goods	  
Open	  access	  resources	  	  
Destination	  and	  national	  promotion	  
Infrastructures	  
Co-­‐ordination	  
Planning	  	  
Externalities	  
Positive	  externalities	  
-­‐	  Tourism	  expenditures	  
-­‐	  Wildlife	  preservation	  
-­‐	   Conservation	   of	   human	   man-­‐made	  
monuments	  
-­‐	   Consciousness	   of	   the	   environment	  
and	  local	  culture	  
	  
Negative	  externalities	  
-­‐	  Increase	  in	  crime	  rates	  
-­‐	  Negative	  attitudes	  of	  the	  host	  
population	  towards	  tourists	  
-­‐	  Congestion	  (overcrowding)	  
-­‐	  Crowdedness	  effect	  
-­‐	  Excessive	  use	  of	  common	  pool	  
resources	  
-­‐Environmental	   pollution	  
around	  common	  pool	  resources	  
Natural	  	  
Monopoly	  
Export	  markets	  
Tourism	  product	  differentiation	  
Tourist	  attraction	  
Asymmetric	  
Information	  
Tourist	  products	  
	  
As	  we	  already	  mentioned,	  the	  public	  policy	  instruments	  have	  grown	  in	  importance	  as	  
tools	  to	  solve	  tourism	  inefficiencies	  caused	  by	  market	  failures.	  But,	  what	  are	  the	  main	  
tools	  purposed	  by	  the	  scientific	  community	  and	  employed	  by	  all	  levels	  of	  government?	  
I	  attempt	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  in	  following	  paragraphs.	  
	  
3.2.	  Tourism	  Policy	  Tools	  
In	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  public	  goods,	  Liang	  and	  Wang	  (2010)	  state	  that	  the	  market	  for	  
tourism	   will	   not	   operate	   efficiently	   to	   produce	   and	   supply	   tourism	   products.	   As	   a	  
result,	   government	   is	   forced	   to	   take	   policy	   measures	   to	   increase	   the	   production	   of	  
public	  goods	  and	  services,	  directly	  invest	  and	  develop	  public	  tourist	  attractions,	  or	  use	  
regulation	   to	   compensate	   and	   inspire	   tourism	   companies	   actively	   involved	   in	   the	  
supply	  of	  public	  tourism	  products.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Blake	  and	  Sinclair	  (2007)	  consider	  
that	   public	   goods	  must	   be	   provided	   collectively	   in	   some	   form,	   either	   through	   direct	  
government	  provision	  or	  through	  compulsory	  membership	  patterns.	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Gooroochrun	   and	   Sinclair	   (2005)	   argue	   that	   taxation	   is	   another	   policy	   tool	   option	   in	  
the	   context	   of	   public	   goods.	   The	   influx	   of	   tourists	   may	   impose	   extra	   public	   costs	  
relating	  to	  the	  provision	  and	  maintenance	  of	  some	  amenities.	  As	  nonresidents,	  tourists	  
do	  not	  pay	  to	  finance	  these	  extras.	  In	  that	  sense,	  a	  tax	  may	  rectify	  the	  balance,	  so	  that	  
the	  burden	  falls	  on	  those	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  increasing	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  provision	  
of	  public	  goods.	  
Concerning	   externalities,	   Blake	   and	   Sinclair	   (2007)	   highlight	   that	   only	   strict	   social	  
regulation,	  including	  a	  Pigouvian	  tax,	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  property	  rights	  or	  program	  
approval	  allow	  the	  government	   to	   transform	  the	   fee	  caused	  by	  external	  uneconomic	  
behavior	   into	   the	   enterprise	   internal	   cost,	   which	   can	   effectively	   avoid	   crowded	  
externality	   of	   public	   goods.	   Liang	   and	   Wang	   (2010)	   and	   Gooroochrun	   and	   Sinclair	  
(2005)	  also	  argue	  that	  externalities	  can	  be	  address	  by	  taxation.	  	  
In	  turn,	  natural	  monopolies	  can	  also	  be	  address	  by	  taxation.	  According	  to	  Gooroochrun	  
and	   Sinclair	   (2005),	   the	   economic	   rents	   provoked	   by	   a	   monopoly	   situation	   can	   be	  
corrected	   by	   using	   taxation	   to	   shift	   the	  misallocation	   of	   resources.	   Liang	   and	  Wang	  
(2010)	   consider	   that	   economic	   regulation	   has	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   as	   well,	   in	   order	   to	  
control	  excessive	  monopoly	  power	  and	  enhance	  social	  welfare.	  	  
Finally,	   asymmetric	   information	   can	  be	   solved	  by	   regulation.	   Liang	   and	  Wang	   (2010)	  
argue	   that	   governments	   must	   adopt	   tourism	   information	   disclosure	   mechanisms	   or	  
carry	  out	  quality	  grade	  standards	  for	  tourist	  attraction	  and	  other	  normative	  criteria	  in	  
order	  to	  weak	  the	  degree	  of	  information	  asymmetry	  between	  two	  parties	  involved	  in	  
tourism	  deals.	  Table	  5	  condenses	  the	  main	  policy	  tools	  used	  to	  solve	  tourism	  market	  
failures.	  	  
	  
Table	  5	  –	  Generic	  Policy	  Tools	  to	  Address	  Tourism	  Market	  Failures	  
Tourism	  Market	  Failures	   Generic	  Solutions	  
Public	  Goods	   Direct	  Supply	  |	  Regulation	  |	  Taxation	  	  
Externalities	   Social	  regulation	  (Pigouvian	  tax)	  |	  Taxation	  
Natural	  Monopoly	  	   Economic	  regulation	  |	  Taxation	  	  
Asymmetric	  information	  	   Regulation	  	  
	  
These	  are	  the	  main	  policy	  tools	  presented	  by	  the	  literature	  to	  solve	  specific	  problems	  
related	  with	  market	  failures.	  However,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  find	  more	  references	  to	  tourism	  
policy	   tools,	   even	   if	   the	   studies	   in	   question	   do	   not	   refer	   to	   any	   market	   failure	   in	  
specific.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   following	   tools	   are	   very	   important	   due	   to	   the	   economic,	  
social	   and	   environmental	   impacts	   caused	   by	   tourism	   activity.	   Bramwell	   (2005),	   for	  
example,	   believes	   that	   policy	   instruments	   that	   government	   can	   use	   in	   order	   to	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promote	   a	   sustainable	   tourism	   activity	   can	   be	   categorized	   into	   four	   categories:	  
government	   encouragement;	   government	   financial	   incentives;	   government	  
expenditures	  and	  government	  regulations.	  	  
The	   first	   one	   includes	   information,	   education,	   and	   general	   persuasion	   directed	   at	  
operators,	   tourists,	   or	   communities	   in	   tourist	   areas	   in	   order	   to	   encourage	   them	   to	  
voluntarily	  adopt	  more	  sustainable	  behaviors	  (Bramwell,	  2005).	  
The	   second	   group	   consists	   in	   altering	   prices	   facing	   businesses,	   tourists,	   or	   host	  
communities	   for	   environmentally	   or	   culturally	   damaging	   or	   beneficial	   behavior.	   The	  
author	  defends	  the	  use	  of	  taxes	  or	  subsidies	  in	  order	  to	  make	  some	  resources	  more	  or	  
less	   expensive	   than	   others,	   so	   that	   activities	   change	   as	   a	   consequence.	   Hunter	   and	  
Green	   (1995)	   refer	   some	  examples:	   user	   fees	   for	   entry	   into	  natural	   or	   cultural	   sites,	  
local	   tourist	   taxes	   designed	   to	   raise	   revenue	   for	   environmental	   work	   or	   to	   control	  
visitor	  pressure	  by	  deterring	  visitors,	  and	  charges	  for	  water	  consumption	  by	  hotels	  that	  
are	   intended	   to	   encourage	   water	   conservation.	   Subsidies	   offer	   positive	   incentives,	  
such	  as	  providing	  payments	  to	  hotels	  that	  introduce	  energy-­‐saving	  techniques.	  
Government	   expenditures	   are	   the	   third	   policy	   tool.	   Government	   expenditures	   are	  
actions	   taken	   directly	   by	   government	   or	   state-­‐owned	   agencies,	   such	   as	   spending	   on	  
public	  transport,	   land	  purchase,	  and	  conservation	  measures	  in	  national	  parks,	  and	  on	  
community	  development	  initiatives	  and	  waste	  management	  (Bramwell,	  2005).	  	  
Lastly,	  the	  author	  defines	  government	  regulations	  as	  tools	  that	  either	  forbid	  or	  require	  
a	   particular	   behavior,	   but	   which	   do	   not	   involve	   financial	   incentives	   or	   direct	  
government	   expenditures.	   As	   Jacobs	   (1991)	   refers	   these	   policy	   tools	   induce	   tourism	  
businesses	  or	  tourists	  to	  obey,	  with	  disobedience	  likely	  to	  involve	  judicial	  punishment.	  	  
Logar	  (2010)	  presents	  another	  group	  of	  policy	  tools.	  Considering	  a	  sustainable	  tourism	  
activity,	  the	  author	  analysed	  the	  effect	  of	  several	  types	  of	  instruments:	  market-­‐based	  
(eco-­‐taxes,	  user	  fees,	  financial	  incentives	  and	  tradable	  permits	  building),	  regulatory	  or	  
command-­‐and-­‐control	   instruments	   (zoning	   and	   quotas)	   and	   institutional	   tools	   (eco-­‐
labels	  and	  changes	  in	  property	  rights).	  Hall	  and	  Jenkins	  (1997)	  list	  eighteen	  tools	  with	  
the	   aim	   of	   promoting	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   tourism,	   including	   command-­‐and-­‐control,	  
voluntary	   instruments,	   expenditures,	   financial	   incentives	   and	   non-­‐intervention	  
decisions.	  In	  turn,	  Jordan,	  Wurzel	  and	  Zito	  (2005)	  and	  Zito,	  Radaelli	  and	  Jordan	  (2003)	  
and	   considered	   what	   the	   literature	   calls	   the	   new	   policy	   instruments,	   including	  
benchmarking,	  co-­‐regulation,	  voluntary	  codes	  of	  conduct	  and	  negotiated	  agreements,	  
voluntary	   agreements	   and	   environmental	   management	   systems.	   Prideaux	   (2005)	  
points	  out	  that	  the	  policy	   instruments	  that	  may	  affect	   tourism	   include	   interest	  rates,	  
anti-­‐inflation	  policies,	  exchange	  rate	  controls	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  indirect	  taxation.	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Taking	   in	   account	   the	   different	   policy	   tools	   applied	   to	   the	   tourism	   context	   and	   the	  
instrument	   typology	  presented	  by	  Weimer	   and	  Vining	   (2005)	   this	  work	   aims	   to	   fill	   a	  
gap	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  provide	  a	  broader	  typology	  of	  tourism	  policy	  tools.	  With	  this	  
contribute	   I	   investigate	  which	   instruments	   are	   used	   by	   Portuguese	  municipalities	   to	  
address	  traditional	  market	  failures.	  	  
	  
3.2.	  Hypotheses	  	  
Based	   on	   our	   theoretical	   framework	   above	   and	   considering	   a	   generic	   perspective,	   I	  
derive	  two	  preliminary	  hypotheses:	  	  
H1:	  Tourism	  policy	  tools	  of	  a	  regulatory	  nature	  are	  used	  more	  frequently	  than	  
market	  policy	  tools.	  	  
H2:	  Market-­‐type	   policy	   tools	   produce	   better	   results	   to	   solve	   tourism	  market	  
failures.	  	  
These	   hypotheses	   are	   supported	   by	   two	  main	   arguments.	   Firstly,	   the	   literature	   that	  
advocates	   that	  command-­‐and-­‐control	   tools	  are	  used	  to	  a	  significantly	  greater	  degree	  
than	  market-­‐type	  tools,	  despite	  the	  economists	  consistent	  endorsement	  of	   the	   latter	  
(Keohane,	   Revesz	   and	   Stavins,	   1998).	   Secondly,	   Portuguese	   local	   governments	   are	  
traditionally	   involved	   in	   direct	   provision	   of	   public	   goods	   and	   services	   (Rodrigues,	  
Tavares	  and	  Araújo,	  2011).	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  local	  governments	  will	  play	  
an	  active	  role	  in	  solving	  tourism	  market	  failures.	  	  
Other	   hypotheses	   will	   be	   developed	   to	   account	   for	   specific	   attributes	   of	   the	  
Portuguese	   local	   reality	   and	   tourist	   market.	   These	   hypotheses	   will	   be	   tested	   using	  
variables	  and	   indicators	  describing	   the	  economic,	  political	  and	  environmental	   setting	  
where	  policy	  adoption	  takes	  place.	  
These	   hypotheses	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   empirical	   tests	   using	   data	   collected	   for	   this	  
purpose.	   The	   first	   goal	   is	   to	   identify	  which	   tourism	   policy	   tools	   are	  most	   frequently	  
used	   by	   Portuguese	  municipalities.	   In	   order	   to	   accomplish	   this	   task,	   I	   will	   employ	   a	  
survey	  questionnaire	  to	  all	  municipalities	  (308).	  This	  questionnaire	  will	  be	  elaborated	  
considering	   the	   typology	   of	  Weimer	   and	  Vining	   (2005)	   and	   the	   policy	   tools	   that	   the	  
literature	   identifies	  as	   relevant	   in	   the	   tourism	  area	   (Bramwell,	  2005;	  Dimitris,	  Aimilia	  
and	  George,	  2005;	  Hall	  and	  Jenkins,	  1997;	  Jordan,	  Wurzel	  and	  Zito,	  2005;	  Logar,	  2010;	  
Prideaux,	  2005;	  Scott,	  2011;	  Zito,	  Radaelli	  and	  Jordan,	  2003).	  After	  the	  questionnaire	  is	  
pre-­‐tested	  and	  ready,	   it	  will	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  tourism	  department	   in	  each	  municipality.	  
Once	   this	   task	   is	   completed,	   our	   dependent	   variable	   –	   the	   policy	   tools	   adopted	   by	  
Portuguese	  municipalities	  –	  will	  be	  refined.	  The	  dependent	  variable	  will	  be	  measured	  
either	  as	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  –	  the	  policy	  instrument	  is	  either	  present	  or	  absent	  in	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each	  municipality.	  Probit	  models	  will	  be	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  likelihood	  of	  adoption	  of	  
each	  policy	  instrument.	  	  
The	   independent	   variables	   underlying	   this	   research	   are	   all	   the	   variables	   that	   can	   be	  
identified	   as	   determinants	   of	   policy	   tool	   adoption.	   Many	   of	   these	   variables	   will	   be	  
measured	   using	   the	   questionnaire	   mentioned	   above.	   For	   example,	   to	   characterize	  
natural	   monopoly	   situations,	   I	   will	   investigate	   the	   existence	   of	   tourism	   product	  
differentiation	  in	  each	  municipality.	  As	  mentioned	  by	  Gooroochrun	  and	  Sinclair	  (2005)	  
the	  existence	  of	   a	   tourism	  product	   that	   allows	   seeing	  or	  doing	   something	  unique	  or	  
exclusive	  signals	  market	  power.	  Examples	  of	  this	  product	  differentiation	   include	  river	  
beaches,	  thematic	  parks,	  local	  festivals,	  city-­‐spas	  or	  radical	  sports.	  Public	  goods	  can	  be	  
tackled	  by	  either	  providing	  the	  good	  directly	  as	  with	  infrastructures,	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  
planning	  strategies	  or	  by	  using	  market-­‐based	  incentives.	  The	  research	  will	   investigate	  
indicators	   of	   open	   access	   resources	   as	   beaches,	   natural	   parks	   or	   environmentally	  
preserved	  areas	  as	  predictors	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  specific	  policy	  tools	  to	  address	  public	  
goods	  problems.	  The	  negative	  externalities	  are	  also	  considered.	  I	  explore,	  for	  example,	  
the	  existence	  of	  beach	  police	  to	  reduce	  crime	  rates	  that	  increase	  in	  periods	  of	  higher	  
influx	  of	   tourists.	   Finally,	   information	  asymmetries	   can	  be	  addressed	   in	   a	  number	  of	  
different	  ways.	  Local	  governments	  can	  have	  tourism	  offices	  that	  allow	  tourists	  to	  get	  
reliable	   information	   about	   where	   to	   go,	   which	   places	   to	   visit	   or	   what	   products	   to	  
consume.	   Indicators	   regarding	   the	   number	   of	   tourist	   operators,	   the	   publication	   of	  
information	   regarding	   the	   reputation	   of	   tourist	   operators,	   the	   type	   of	   tourist	  
attractions,	   and	   the	   typical	   tourist	   packages	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   indicators	   of	  
information	  asymmetries	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  local	  governments	  using	  tourist	  
offices	  or	  other	  policy	  tools	  towards	  a	  similar	  end.	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